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Abstract:  Simon Blackburn objects that Wittgenstein’s private language argument overlooks the 
possibility of a private linguist equipping himself with a criterion of correctness by confirming 
generalisations about the patterns in which his private sensations occur.  Crispin Wright responds 
that appropriate generalisations would be too few to be interesting.  But I show that Wright’s 
calculations are upset by his failure to appreciate both the richness of the data and the range of 
theories that would be available to the linguist. 
   
Wittgenstein famously poses a problem for the idea of a private language, i.e. a language no two 
people could have reason to believe they share, as a language for describing sensations would be, 
if sensations were in principle inaccessible to anyone but their subjects.  The problem the aspirant 
speaker of such a language faces, according to Wittgenstein, is that he could never reasonably 
convict himself of incorrect uses of its terms.  He would, Wittgenstein says, “have no criterion of 
correctness”, and hence he would not really be speaking a language at all (1953, §258). 
Simon Blackburn and Crispin Wright agree this is Wittgenstein’s point.1  But Blackburn 
thinks Wittgenstein overlooks that a speaker might regulate his use of a private sensation 
language by exploiting well confirmed generalisations about the patterns in which his sensations 
occur.2  Wright offers Wittgenstein an intriguing response:  even if an aspirant speaker might do 
this, not just any generalisation will do; indeed, it turns out that the ratio of useful to useless 
generalisations is so small that there is only a negligible probability of one’s being able to equip 
oneself to understand a language in the proposed way. 
In what follows, I argue that Wright’s assessment of the aspirant linguist’s chances is 
flawed.  Though I suspect Wittgenstein can successfully be defended against Blackburn, my 
business in this paper is simply to show why, in doing so, one must not concede as much to 
Blackburn as Wright does. 
 
I.  BLACKBURN’S PROPOSAL 
 
Let P1 be a phenomenological category of sensations.  Suppose a subject, A, undergoes 
sensations at times t1 and t2.  A judges at t1  
s1: I am undergoing a P1 sensation, 
and is inclined to judge at t2 both not-s1 and  
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H: the sensation I am undergoing is of the same phenomenological type as the sensation 
I was undergoing at t1. 
 
A’s inclinations at t2 are insufficient to justify a verdict that his earlier judgement, s1, was false.  He 
might just as well deny either H or not-s1.  So the example does not show that A has a criterion 
of correctness.  But, Blackburn argues, A would have more to go on than mere classificatory 
inclinations if he became a theorist about his sensations, engaged in a “project … of ordering the 
expectation of the occurrence of sensation, with an aim at prediction, explanation, 
systematisation” (pp. 299-300).  Instead of H being a mere impression of the phenomenological 
identity of two sensations, for example, A might have established a correlation between two or 
more sensation types.  Theories are ultimately answerable to observation, of course, but such a 
correlation might be sufficiently well confirmed to warrant, in a given case, protecting it against a 
putative counterexample by rejecting a particular sensation judgement instead.  Of course, A 
would still have to choose which particular sensation judgement to revoke.  (After all, in the 
example above, even if there were reason to protect H, there would still be a choice as to which 
of s1(t1) and not-s1(t2) to revoke.)  But if A confirms more correlations and has more 
classificatory inclinations, the idea is that he could make a principled decision on this further 
matter too.  So equipped, Blackburn thinks, A could exploit such theoretical ideals as simplicity 
to underpin his verdicts about the correctness and incorrectness of his sensation judgements. 
 Wright illustrates Blackburn’s proposal as follows (pp. 239-41).3  Suppose A undergoes 
three types of sensation: P1, P2, and P3.  Let “S1” abbreviate “I underwent a P1 sensation at some 
point in the preceding six minutes”, “not-S1” abbreviate “I did not undergo a P1 sensation during 
the preceding six minutes”; and read “S2”, “not-S2”, “S3”, and “not-S3” similarly, mutatis mutandis.  
(Note that I intend the capital “S” to distinguish these past-tense judgements from the present 
tense s1, above.)  Suppose that, during an extended period, A confirms that the following pattern 
is exhibited over any six minutes:  “If I did not undergo a P1 sensation in the preceding six 
minutes, then I underwent a P2 sensation; if I underwent a P3 sensation, then I did not undergo a 
P2 sensation”.  This can be represented using the material conditionals 
H1: ~S1 → S2 
H2: S3 → ~S2. 
 
Now, there are eight internally consistent sets of judgement A might make about any six minutes.  
Wright represents these “diary types”, as I call them, as follows:4 
                                                     
3
 I have changed some minor aspects of Wright’s presentation.   
4
 The right-hand side of the table is my elaboration, explained below. 
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 Diary type S1 S2 S3 Is the diary consistent with {H1, H2}?  
 1 T T T 
2 T T F 
3 T F T 
4 T F F 
5 F T T 
6 F T F 
7 F F T 
8 F F F 
r 
 
 
 
r OC for S3 
 
r OC for not-S1 
r 
 
 
Here, an “F” under S1 on the fifth row means that one of the three judgements in a type-5 diary 
is not-S1. 
 We can now apply Blackburn’s idea to the judgement type, S3.  Suppose A records a 
type-5 diary, judging not-S1, S2, and S3.  The conjunction of S2 and S3 is inconsistent with H2, so a 
correction is needed.  Since H2 is, unlike H in the original example, a well confirmed correlation, 
A can reasonably try to preserve it, narrowing the candidates for revision to two:  S2 and S3.  Of 
these, S2 is corroborated by A’s judgement, not-S1:  given H1, revoking S2 (i.e. substituting not-S2) 
would require also revoking not-S1.  So it is simpler for A to revise S3 instead.  Hence Blackburn 
seems vindicated.  A appears to have what Wittgenstein denied he could have:  a criterion of 
correctness for S3.  Again, given {H1, H2}, A’s recording a type-5 diary appears to be a 
circumstance in which he can reasonably revise a judgement of S3, thereby deciding that the 
correct account of his inner life over those six minutes was a diary not of type-5, but of type-6. 
 
2.  WRIGHT’S OBJECTION 
 
 Relative to a theory, a diary type is what I call “optimally correctable” (OC) for a type of 
sensation judgement, Si, if and only if any diary of that type is such that 
(i)  it includes a judgement of Si  
(ii)  it is inconsistent with the theory,  
(iii) consistency can be restored in a way that involves revising Si within that diary, and  
(iv)  all other ways of restoring consistency involve more corrections to that diary than 
ways that involve revising, within that diary, Si.5 
 
Hence the preceding paragraph shows that {H1, H2} renders the fifth diary type OC for S3, as it 
does the seventh type for not-S1.  But, to appreciate Wright’s claim that not just any 
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generalisation will serve the private linguist’s purposes, begin by noticing that {H1, H2} fails, by 
contrast, to generate OC diary types for S1, S2, not-S2, and not-S3,.  For these judgements, any 
diary type satisfying the first three conditions for being OC fails the fourth. 
In the case of S1 and not-S3, for example, they fail because, if any diary inconsistent with 
{H1, H2} were recorded, there would be a way of restoring consistency that involved fewer 
corrections to that diary than ways that involve revising the judgement, within that diary, either of 
S1 or of not-S3.  Take S1, for example.  Type-1 diaries are the only type inconsistent with {H1, 
H2} that involve S1.  And, admittedly, if one were recorded, consistency could be restored by 
revising S1 and S3 together.  But it could also be restored by revising either S2 or S3 alone.  So S1 
lacks an OC diary relative to {H1, H2}. 
In the case of S2 and not-S2, relevant diaries fail the fourth condition because, if any diary 
inconsistent with {H1, H2} were recorded, there would be a way of restoring consistency that 
involved the same number of corrections to that diary as ways that involve revising the judgement, 
within that diary, either of S2 or of not-S2.  Take S2, for example.  The only diaries that are both 
recalcitrant and contain S2 are type-1 and type-5.  If a type-1 diary were recorded, admittedly, 
consistency could be restored by revising S2, but it could also be restored by revising S3.  As for 
type-5 diaries, we have already seen that, if one were recorded, the way of restoring consistency 
that would involve fewest corrections to that diary would be revising its judgement of S3, not S2.  
So S2 lacks an OC diary relative to {H1, H2}. 
Now, Wright’s objection to Blackburn crucially, if implicitly, involves the following 
conditional: 
 
W: a generalisation determines a criterion of correctness for a putative judgement type, 
Si, only if it determines an OC diary type for Si. 
 
W can be seen to be operative, for example, in Wright’s slide from the preceding account of why 
S2 lacks an OC diary type to the view that there is no situation in which it would be reasonable for 
A to revoke a judgement of S2 (pp. 241-2).  Assuming that the simplest way to restore 
consistency is the most reasonable, and noticing that the only recalcitrant diaries involving S2 are 
the first and fifth, Wright clearly has the following idea.  On the one hand, if a type-1 diary were 
recorded, then no correction would be reasonable, since, although revoking S2 and revoking S3 
would both be more simple corrections than any others, neither would be more simple than the 
other, and hence there would be no basis for choosing which to make.  On the other hand, if a 
type-5 diary were recorded, the simplest and hence most reasonable way of restoring consistency 
would involve revoking S3, not S2.  Thus using W, Wright concludes that, relative to {H1, H2}, A 
lacks a criterion of correctness for S2.  And he draws the same conclusion for S1, not-S2, and not-
S3.  Hence these fail to be types of genuine judgement.   
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 In three steps, Wright reaches a more ambitious conclusion.  First, he suggests that a 
judgement can be genuine only if its truth-functional compounds are, and that merely putative 
judgements could hardly render a diary inconsistent with a theory.  Hence he argues that the lack 
of criteria of correctness for S1, S2, not-S2, and not-S3 has a “rotten apple effect”, undermining the 
prima facie claim of the remaining types to being genuine (pp. 242-3).  Second, Wright thinks this 
rotten apple effect makes plausible a further conditional:  a theory will generate criteria of 
correctness for judgements about any sensation types it concerns only if it generates criteria of 
correctness for judgements about all of those types (p. 247).  Given W, this means that a theory 
must generate OC diaries for all such judgements.   Third, Wright presents extensive formal work 
(due largely to Warren Goldfarb), aiming to show that the ratio of theories that meet this 
condition to theories that fail it is very small, and smaller the more types of sensation the theories 
concern (pp. 258-266).  Thus, he concludes, A has a very low chance of confirming a theory 
equipping him to speak a private language.  If, for instance, the theory in question is to range 
over four sensation types, then on Wright’s calculations there is a one in 8,192 chance of an 
aspirant private linguist confirming a correlation that fits the bill! 
Wright thinks this conclusion will worry friends of privacy for two reasons (p. 250):  
first, because he has shown that Blackburn’s theorising proposal makes the possibility of a 
subject’s speaking a private language contingent on the precise patterns in which his sensations 
occur; and second, because Wright thinks he has shown that the chances of a subject’s sensations 
exhibiting an appropriate pattern is very small.  Even if these two points are right, however, it is 
unclear why friends of privacy need be anxious.  For one thing, it is surely Wittgenstein, rather 
than friends of privacy, who would reject the dependence of private sensation languages on the 
patterns the sensations exhibit.  As Wright concedes, Wittgenstein seems to think a private 
language is logically impossible; he would surely not be insouciant about its being merely 
improbable.  For another thing, friends of privacy might be.  They might point out the following 
parallel:  that Wittgenstein’s own rule-following considerations show the possibility of a public 
language to be highly contingent.6  That contingency is tolerable, they might say, if only because 
the actual world is patently one in which public language is possible; and they might suggest that 
Wright’s probabilities in the private case are tolerable too, on parallel grounds.   Be all that as it 
may, the objection I want to develop against Wright is different:  namely, even if the private 
language issue were one of the aspirant linguist’s odds, Wright has underestimated them.   
 
3.  CONDITIONAL W 
 
One important reason Wright underestimates the private linguist’s chances is that W, the 
crux of Wright’s calculations, is false.  To take one of its counterexamples, {H1, H2} does 
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determine circumstances in which A would have grounds for correcting a judgement of S2, 
notwithstanding the fact that {H1, H2} does not provide an OC diary for S2.  (Or, to exercise 
proper caution, {H1, H2} determines criteria of correctness for that judgement type unless such 
criteria are undermined by the rotten apple effect, to which I return below.) 
To see this, recall that {H1, H2} is a theory confirmed as holding over any six minutes.  
Now Wright is thinking of A’s diaries being recorded in serial succession, concerning consecutive 
periods of six minutes.  This undermines the natural reply against Wright that, if A records a 
recalcitrant diary that cannot be non-arbitrarily revised now, then A might for the time being 
continue to record his classificatory inclinations until he provides himself with sufficient data to 
enable a later principled revision of that earlier diary.  This reply is undermined because, when we 
think of diaries recorded in serial succession, it is difficult to see how a collection of diaries which 
individually provide no reason to change S2 could fare any better collectively.  However, if {H1, H2} 
holds over any six minute period, there is no reason why we should follow Wright in thinking of 
it being applied only to diaries recorded in serial succession.  Surely, A can start a new diary as 
soon after its predecessor commences as he likes. 
To flesh out this possibility, suppose that the past-tense judgements constituting a diary, 
such as “I underwent a P1 sensation at some point in the preceding six minutes” (that is, 
judgement S1), are based on present-tense judgements made during the six minutes in question, 
such as “I am undergoing a P1 sensation” (which judgement I abbreviate with the lower-case 
“s1”).  Suppose, then, that every two minutes, starting at t1, A undergoes a sensation, about which 
he makes a present-tense judgement; and, every two minutes, starting at t0, he begins a new six-
minute diary.  The crucial upshot is that, after six minutes, every token, present-tense judgement 
A makes will contribute not to one diary, but to three, as illustrated below: 
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 t0 t2 t4 t6          
 s1 s1 s3 t8        
C 
Type 3 
T 
 
T T s3  
t10 
      
 D 
Type 3 
T 
 
T T s1  
t12 
     
  E 
Type 3 
T 
 
T T s3  
t14 
    
   F 
Type 3 
T 
 
T T s2  
t16 
   
    G 
Type 1 
T 
 
? T ? F 
~s2 
s1  
t18 
  
     H 
Type 1 
? T 
 
? F 
~s2 
T s3  
t20 
 
      I 
Type 1 
? F 
~s2 
T ? T s3  
t22 
       J 
Type 3 
T 
 
T T s1  
        K 
Type 3 
T 
 
T T  
 
In this diagram, each horizontal row of three squares represents a diary, named with a letter to its 
left.7  The abbreviation above each square represents the present-tense judgement the private 
linguist makes when he undergoes each sensation.  Moreover, suppose that when A judges that a 
sensation of one type occurs, he simultaneously judges that sensations of the other types do not.  
When he judges s1, for example, he also judges not-s2 and not-s3.  Hence by t6, for example, A 
has recorded a type-3 diary, C, since the record of his present-tense judgements between t0 and t6 
determines the pre-theoretical, past-tense conclusion that, while sensations of types P1 and P3 
have occurred over that period, no sensation of type P2 has.  Now, a “T” in a box indicates a 
post-theoretical confirmation of a pre-theoretical judgement; an “F” indicates a post-theoretical 
revision, the new judgement being written beneath the “F”; a question mark indicates that a 
judgement is one of a pair in that diary such that, though one should be revised, there is no basis 
at the time of completing the diary for a principled decision as to which. 
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 Strictly, a diary is a set of three past-tense, not present-tense, judgements.  But my relaxation in usage is unproblematic, 
provided past-tense judgements made at the end of the six minute period reflect present-tense judgements made during it. 
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The significance of the diaries’ overlapping is this:  if A revokes the t13 judgement of s2 in 
diary I, for example, A thereby revokes it in diaries G and H, since the judgement s2 in all three 
diaries is one and the same token judgement.  Crucially, then, overlapping diaries create the 
possibility that some alterations to a recalcitrant diary will solve up to three diaries (including 
itself) and some alterations to one diary will cause up to three diaries (including itself) to become 
recalcitrant.  This provides more leverage for making principled revisions. 
 To see the counterexample to W, consider the diagram’s details.  After a series of four 
overlapping type-3 diaries (C through F), A judges s2 at t13.  This is the last entry in diary G 
(completed at t14), which is a recalcitrant type-1 diary, needing revision.  At t14 (that is, looking 
only at diaries C through G), there is no principled way of deciding which of s2 and s3 to revoke 
within G.  The subsequent completion of diary H is of no help either, since these two candidate 
corrections to G, between which A could not choose at t14, are identical to the two candidates 
corrections to H (also type-1) between which there is still no choosing.  The ratio of solved 
diaries to revised judgements would be 2:1 for each of s2 and s3.  However, the completion at t18 
of diary I (type-1 again) is helpful, since it is now the case that changing one token judgement of s2 
(t13) would solve three diaries (G, H, and I) whereas a revision to s3 could achieve such a reward 
only at the greater cost of changing two token judgements (t11 and t17). Moreover, a provisional 
correction of s2 would not be upset by the completion of diaries J and K, since these are not 
recalcitrant and thus cannot be solved (since they do not need solving) by a change to the t17 
judgement of s3. 
 On its face, this is a situation in which, guided by the ideal of simplicity, A has precisely 
what Wright thinks he could never have:  a reason to revise his judgement S2 (and the present-
tense s2), generated by the correlation {H1, H2}, despite the fact that S2 lacks an OC diary.  A 
similar example can be given for not-S2.  Therefore Wright’s conditional, W, which makes an OC 
diary a necessary condition for a criterion of correctness, is false. 
 
4.  NEGLECTED THEORIES 
 
My conclusion might seem premature, given Wright’s claim that a theory will generate criteria of 
correctness for judgements about any of the sensation types it concerns only if it generates them 
for judgements about all those types.  Overlapping diaries meant that we could generate prima 
facie criteria of correctness for more judgement types than could Wright, but since I doubt that 
we can use overlapping diaries to generate even prima facie criteria for s1  and not-s3, the rotten 
apple threat remains.  Here, then, it is important to notice that Wright not only overlooks the use 
of overlapping diaries to enrich the putative linguist’s data; he overlooks the range of theories 
that might be available to the linguist.  Why, for example, might the linguist not consider theories 
concerning the temporal order of A’s sensations? 
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Suppose, for instance, that instead of {H1, H2} (a theory comprising material 
conditionals), A confirmed the following: 
 H
3: P1 ⇒ P2 
 H
4: P2 ⇒ P3 
 H
5: P3 ⇒ P1. 
 
Read H
3 
as “a sensation of type P1 will be succeeded by a sensation of type P2 before a sensation 
of another type”, and read H
4
and H
5
 similarly, mutatis mutandis.  Now imagine that A records the 
following series of pre-theoretical judgements: 
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12 
s1 s2 s3 s1 s2 s3 s1 s1 s3 s1   s2 s3 
 
As before, suppose that every time A judges that he is undergoing a sensation of one type, he 
simultaneously judges that he is not undergoing either of the other types.  Now, having recorded 
this set of pre-theoretical judgements between t1 and t12, surely A could decide that, since {H3, 
H4, H5} is well confirmed, he must have been wrong in two of the three judgements he made at 
t8: namely, both s1 and not-s2.  And there are similar examples in which A makes principled 
revisions to tokens of the remaining four types of judgement. 
 Another case:  Wright argues there are no theories about two sensation types that 
generate criteria of correctness for all of the judgements a subject might make (p. 248).  But, once 
we enlarge the range of theories on offer, this seems false.  Consider, 
 H6: P1 ⇒ P2. 
Having recorded the following series of judgements 
t1  t2  t3  t4  t5  t6  t7  t8 
s1  s2  s1  s2  s1  s1  s1  s2 
 
A could reasonably conclude that both of his judgements at t6 were incorrect: s1 and not-s2.  And 
having recorded the following series of judgements 
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 
s1 s2 s1 s2 s2 s2 s1 s2 
 
he could reasonably conclude that both of his judgements at t5 were incorrect: s2 and not-s1.  
Wright has not explained why this theory and its more complex cousins fall short of generating 
criteria of correctness for all the judgements whose subject matter they concern. 
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So Wright underestimates the potency of Blackburn’s objection to Wittgenstein.  If we concede 
that the aspirant private linguist might at least attempt to establish a criterion of correctness by 
theorising about his sensations, we cannot then defuse this concession’s implications for the anti-
privacy view by invoking Wright’s meagre assessment of the linguist’s odds of succeeding.  For 
Wright’s calculations are mistaken:  he underestimates both the richness of the data and the range 
of theories that would be available to the linguist.  Hence those of us who doubt the possibility 
of a private language must not allow the issue to come down to such a calculation of odds.8 
David Bain 
University of Nottingham 
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